中文摘要：

本文从中国沪深两市观测到的上市公司中CEO和董事薪酬的趋同现象，综合代理理论和乘员理论等多理论基础，基于薪酬激励和公司治理绩效的关系，考察了董事与CEO之间的合谋、单边激励和共同激励等复杂关系。论文采用2005—2007年度我国上市公司样本池数据，通过混合回归、固定效应回归和敏感性分析等实证检验发现，我国董事与CEO薪酬激励已初步与公司业绩挂钩，但是研究揭示CEO激励走在董事绩效激励前面，董事激励不足问题突出。进一步的研究发现上市公司中CEO薪酬与公司业绩正向相关，董事薪酬对公司业绩没有显著影响；结论认为我国上市公司中董事与CEO关系并非简单合谋或共同激励关系，而是处于CEO选择合适角色或监控得当，董事仍持代理角色，并且其战略指导要弱于监控作用的“单边激励”状况。

英文摘要：

Based on the Stewardship theory and Agency theory, the paper analyzes the complex relationships between CEO and directors of board. The authors hypothesize there exist such three kinds of relationships as collusion, one - side incentive and mutual incentive if only considering the consistent correlation of CEO＇s compensa- tion and director＇s compensation. Then, the authors test those relationships by surveying Chinese listed companies of 2005 -2007 on the association between their compensation and firm performance. By using Pooled regress, Fixed - effect regress and sensitivity analysis, the results show CEO＇s compensation is related positively to finn＇s future performance but directors＇ compensation doesn＇t take an effect on finn performance though both of them are positively correlated significantly, so there is one - side incentive situation instead of collusion or mu- tual incentives in Chinese listed companies, which means CEO choose the suitable role while directors play agents＇ roles and lead to boards＇ strategy role weaker than their control roles. The further test finds that CEO＇ incentive compensation is better than director＇s incentive compensation regardless of CEO＇s compensation and director＇s compensation are both related to the firm prophase performance, so boards should take an efficiency incentive mechanism on directors in China.