中文摘要：

对于管理层激励与企业研发之间的关系，截至目前一直未能获得一致的研究结论。随着研究的不断深入，融资约束在管理层激励与企业研发关系中的重要性也渐渐得到学术界的认可。为明确融资约束对管理层激励与企业研发效率关系的影响，本文基于2009-2013年中国工业上市公司样本数据，运用随机前沿模型考察了管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响，研究表明：对管理层实行货币薪酬激励有利于提高企业研发效率水平，而在对管理层实行股权激励时，应根据企业自身的实际情况给予最佳的持股比例，以避免因股权激励不足或股权激励过大导致企业研发效率低下。同时，考虑到企业所面临的融资约束的现实情况，我们发现，融资约束的存在在一定程度上抑制了货币薪酬激励对企业研发效率的积极作用；相反，却能提高股权激励在企业研发创新方面的治理效应。本文不仅丰富了公司治理与创新管理的相关研究成果，也为企业合理配置管理层薪酬契约以提高企业研发效率的决策提供了经验证据。

英文摘要：

As for the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R＆D, there has been a divergence of current research conclusions. With constant deepening of the research, the importance of financing constraints in the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R＆D has also gradually been recognized by the academia. In order to define the effect of financing constraints on the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R＆D efficiency, based on the data of industrial listed companies from 2009 to 2013 in China, this paper uses stochastic frontier model to analyze the influence of managerial incentives on firm R＆D efficiency, and finds that the monetary compensation incentives for the management are beneficial to the improvement of firm R＆D efficiency level, and when equity incentives for the management are carried out, firms should give the best stake to the management according to their own actual situations, in order to avoid low firm R＆D efficiency resulting from the lack of equity incentives or too large equity incentives. At the same time, taking the reality of financing constraints the firms suffer into account, it finds that financing constraints inhibit the positive role of monetary compensation incentives in firm R＆D efficiency to some extent; on the contrary, it can improve the governance effect of equity incentives on firm R＆D innovation. This paper not only enriches the related research results about corporate governance and innovation management, but also provides the empirical evidence for the reasonable design of management compensation contracts to improve firm R＆D efficiency.