创业股权投资(VEI)在技术创新中的重要性凸显,探究VEI下科技型中小企业分享机理,有利于优化创投效率及新创科技型企业绩效。构建复制动态机制下科技型中小企业分享VEI的博弈模型,设定创投偏好,分析不同VEI规模下科技型中小企业的交互影响,探讨均衡实现条件及影响因素。仿真结果显示:演化稳定性受到竞价起始比例、VEI规模、歧视性竞价、股权估价的影响。为了引导向Pareto最优均衡态演化,创投公司应保密或调整VEI规模,设定竞价上下限,通过正面引导、声明发布等改变中小企业初始种群;科技型中小企业应有差异化股权估价值;政府也应加强科技型中小企业的VEI分享管制。
The paper constructed a VEI sharing game model of S&T based SMEs under replicator dynamics mechanism, set venture investment preference, analyzed reciprocal effect between S&T based SMEs under different scale of VEI, and discussed realization condition and influencing factors of equilibrium. The simulation results showed that evolutionary stability is affected by starting bidding ratio, VEI scale, discriminatory bidding and equity evaluation. In order to lead to evolve toward Pareto optimal equilibrium, venture investment corporation should keep VEI scale secret or adjust it, set low and high bidding limit, and make positive guidance and announcement to change starting population of S&T based SMEs. At the same time, S&T based SMEs ought to make differentiation of equity evaluation. Strengthening governmental control is also useful for equilibrium of VEI sharing.