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中文摘要：
通过研究在位制造商面对外来上游企业产品的质量低于在位产品,且需要支付固定成本时的批发价策略。结果表明：1）上游企业的进入迫使在位企业降低其产品定价,削弱因零售价格过高引起的供应链双重边际效应。2）当固定成本很低时,上游企业进入,此时制造商采用中立定价策略;当固定成本适中时,若固定成本为共同信息,制造商采用价格阻扰定价策略;当固定成本很高时,制造商不需要改变批发价,上游企业不进入。3）当两种产品的价值差异很小,且固定成本为私有信息时,制造商采用中立的定价策略。
英文摘要：
Assuming the entry product quality is less than the incumbent product quality and the entry incurs a fixed cost,this paper investigates the optimal wholesale pricing strategy for the incumbent manufacturer. The results show that the competition can weaken the negative effects of double-marginalization. The incumbent chooses a neutral pricing strategy to allow the entry for a small fixed cost,and selects an opposed pricing strategy to deter the entry when the fixed cost is moderate and common information,and does not change the wholesale price facing the entry deterrence for a high fixed cost. Besides,when the quality difference between the two products is very small and the fixed cost is private information,the incumbent manufacturer prefers a neutral pricing strategy to an opposed pricing strategy.
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