本文研究提高劳动收入份额的政策有效性问题,重点讨论增强市场竞争和劳动者议价权两个政策方向。研究表明,它们对劳动收入份额的影响由市场竞争水平、劳动者议价权水平、生产技术的劳动密集程度决定。数值模拟表明,当前提高市场竞争度和劳动者议价权对制造业总体劳动份额的边际影响分别为0.3和0.02个百分点,故提高劳动份额应以提高市场竞争度为核心而非提高劳动者议价权。
This paper analyzes the impact of market deregulation and bargaining power of labor on labor share. We find that their impacts are determined by the level of market competition, labor's bargaining power, labor intensity of technology. Quantitative Simulation shows that the marginal effect on labor share in manufacture is 0. 3 and 0. 02 percentage points for market deregulation and bargaining power of labor. The conclusion is increasing market deregulation is more effective than increasing bargaining power in terms of labor share enhancement.