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中文摘要：
研究了由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级供应链的合作广告策略。在随机需求条件下,分别考察了Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈两种情形下的最优广告策略,得到了制造商和零售商选择合作时的广告水平、订货量和整条供应链利润均优于不合作情形的结论。对于Stackelberg主从博弈,证明了当满足一定条件时,制造商才会选择承担零售商的广告费用。进一步分析得出博弈的合作均衡具有Pare-to优势,应用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对增加的利润进行了分配。最后,结合数值算例对有关结论进行了验证。
英文摘要：
This paper studies advertising strategy in a two-echelon supply channel with single manufacturer and single retailer.When the market demand is uncertain,the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s optimal advertising strategies of Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game are investigated,respectively.It is shown that all the advertising level,ordering quantity and system profit when the members choose cooperative strategy are larger than those without cooperation.In Stackelberg game,the manufacturer would provide a potion of retailer＇s advertising level under a certain condition.Further,the result that cooperative game equilibrium has more Pareto advantage over non-cooperative game equilibrium is presented,and the surplus is distributed by Rubinstein bargaining model.Finally,numerical examples are given to illustrate and verify the conclusions.
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