中文摘要：

经理人薪酬合约的安排，既是为了缓解代理问题，其本身也可能受到经理人权力的影响。本文实证检验了经理人权力对薪酬结构的影响，发现经理人权力越大时，越倾向于选择高额的货币化报酬，以替代在职消费。进一步看，本文结合经理人权力这一重要权变变量，探讨不同情况下，经理人薪酬结构安排对企业业绩的影响。结论表明，当经理人权力较大时，在职消费一定程度上能够协调公司的利益和经理人的私人利益相一致，对企业业绩发挥积极作用；但当经理人权力越大、同时货币薪酬对在职消费的替代性越强时，经理人越有可能滥用在职消费，降低企业业绩，导致在职消费激励效率低下的主要原因是其使用用途的不规范。不同于以往研究结论中一概而论地只关注在职消费激励的低效率，本文的研究结论部分支持了经理人权力和薪酬结构的相机治理原则。

英文摘要：

Executive compensation contract arrangement is to alleviate the agency problem, which may be subject to the influence of manager＇s power. This article firstly empirically tests the impact of executive power on CEO＇S salary structure. The authors find out some different results in SOE and Non-SOE. Powerful executives in huge SOE are more inclined to choose cash compensation and cash compensation more easily substitutes non-pecuniary compensation. But Maybe because of the tax-saving objective, the result in Non-SOE is on the contrary. When we consider manager＇s power, cash compensation and non-pecuniary compensation in SOE is substitution effect but in Non-SOE they are complementary effect. Furthermore, the authors test the interaction impact of executive power and compensation structure on the corporation performance in different conditions. Research results show that non-pecuniary will negatively influence corporation performance in general, but if the manager is powerful, non-pecuniary compensation can align the corporation＇s interest and the manager＇s private benefit, and have positive effect on enterprises＇ performance. Moreover, if the manag- er is much more powerful, substitution effect of cash compensation to non-pecuniary compensation is stronger, which means there are fewer restrictions on the usage of non-pecuniary compensation and also means non-pecuniary is more likely to be abused, which leads to a worse corporation performance. Unlike previous conclusions focused on the low efficiency of non-pecuniary compensation, conclusions of this paper partially support contingent governance principle of executive power and compensation structure. The authors also test the valid of government regulatory environment on manager＇s compensation and compare the results before and after the financial crisis in 2008. The authors find that the interaction effect of manager＇s power and compensation structure on corporation performance was significantly weakened after the 2008. As to the robustness test, t