为了研究导致我国上市公司总经理更换的影响因素,对总经理更换、公司治理结构以及企业绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析.基于我国上市公司1995~2003年的面板数据,首次利用随机效应Probit模型,按照总经理更换的不同类型进行了实证分析.研究发现,总经理被迫更换概率与企业绩效显著相关,但常规更换则不受此影响.另外,公司治理结构、企业绩效与总经理被迫更换概率有交互效应.企业的法人股东有积极性对经理人员实施监督和约束,在企业绩效下滑时更换总经理,但总经理兼任董事长的情况下,这种影响大为减弱.
Using data of Chinese A-share publicly listed companies gathered from 1995 to 2003, the role of governance structure and firm performance in determining CEO turnover was examined. The main findings are that legal person stockholders have incentive to monitor CEO, and are responsible for CEO leaving when firm incurs bad performance. CEO duality is also solid predictor of CEO turnover. Furthermore, the test of inside directors shows that a high percentage of inside directors does increase CEO turnover, and this effect is stronger with worse firm performance.