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中文摘要：
文章运用“资源属性引起信息成本”和“公共领域带来租金耗散”理论，结合历史计量学的实证方法，对1952—2005年间中国农业管制结构变迁历程重新进行解释，发现国家是否实施农业管制，取决于其成本与收益的计算结果。实证结果表明，在1978年农业剩余索取权管制放松后，国家绩效提高了近55个百分点，农业的效率损失下降了近70个百分点。此外，把经过反历史假设法得到的模拟数据与真实世界的经验数据进行比较发现，无论是国家微观行为绩效，还是农业宏观经济绩效的农业管制放松经验值都超过如果继续维持农业管制结构所获得的模拟值。
英文摘要：
With the theoretical instruments of ＂resource attributes inducing information costs＂ and ＂public domain creating rent dissipation＂, this paper combines the empirical methods in Cliometrics and gives a new explanation of the historic process of the change in agricultural regulation structure from 1952 to 2005 in China. It arrives at the conclusion that the implementation of agricultural regulation depends on the calculation result between reve- nues and costs. And the empirical results show that after the deregulation of agricultural re- sidual claim right in 1978, the state performance increases by nearly 55 percent and the effi- ciency losses in agriculture drop by about 70 percent. In addition, through a comparison be- tween simulation data obtained by anti-history assumption method and evidence data from the real world, it concludes that both the empirical data of agricultural deregulation from the perspective of state micro behavior performance and agricultural macro economic perform- ance are beyond the simulation data under the assumption of the continuous maintenance of agricultural regulation structure.
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