中文摘要：

现金股利的异常派现行为体现了公司内部人利益，是一种非理性派现行为。本文采用2010-2012年中国沪市和深市3414家上市公司作为研究样本，实证检验了异常派现、代理成本和公司价值之间的关系。基准模型的实证结果表明，异常高派现会减少公司内部人所控制的现金资源，增加公司的代理成本，降低代理效率和公司价值。正常派现会增加代理效率与公司价值，是一种理性派现行为。加入交乘项的模型实证结果表明，控制结构哑变量会影响异常高派现公司的代理成本，也会影响异常低派现公司的代理效率。股权性质哑变量不会通过派现行为对公司代理效率产生显著影响，仅有私有性质哑变量通过异常低派现，降低公司的代理效率。

英文摘要：

According to the principal-agent theory, cash dividend plays an important role in restricting the insider control. Jensen pointed out in 1986 that payouts to shareholders can reduce the resources under managers＇ control, thereby reduce managers＇ power. However, Jensen had no regard for the concentration of ownership. A growing research suggests that the concentration of ownership is a common phenomenon in most countries. In fact, large shareholders control a significant number of firms in developed countries. In developing economies, ownership is heavily concentrated. So large shareholders play important role in firm dividend policy. On the one hand, large shareholders are active in improving corporate governance, but on the other hand, large shareholders as company＇s insiders can gain private benefits of control right by concentrated ownership. In the Chinese stock market, large shareholders are widespread. Large shareholders can gain private benefits by cash dividend. In this case, cash dividend shows different forms, such as abnormal high dividend, abnormal low dividend and normal dividend. Abnormal dividend embodies the insider＇s interests, and increase agency costs thus reduce company＇s Value. Based on the data of 2041 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2012, the thesis inspects the relation among abnormal dividend, agency costs and company＇s Value. The results of benchmark model show that, abnormal high dividend can reduce the insider＇s cash resource, increase agency costs, reduce agency efficiency and company＇s value. Normal dividend is a rational dividend behavior, because that it can increase agency efficiency and company＇s value. The results of interaction item model show that, control structure dummy variable has significant effect on agency cost of abnormal high dividend companies and agency efficiency of abnormal low dividend companies. Dummy variable of ownership property has no significant effect on company＇s agency efficiency by dividend behavior. Only dummy variable