力量分析为流零是为块零和公钥算法然而并非还的实现的强大、彻底地学习的威胁。基于二个附近的钟周期之间的消费力量差别,这份报纸论述关联力量分析(CPA ) 对同步溪流零 DECIMv2 (原来的提交 DECIM 的捏的版本) 的攻击。这攻击重新同步不停地,与许多,不同初始化珍视的密码的设备(IV ) 跟踪获得足够的力量。然后与关联系数由为微分力量的统计性质建模跟踪,建议攻击算法能完全揭示 DECIMv2 的秘密钥匙。而且,模拟攻击被发动证实算法的有效性。DECIMv2 的全部秘密钥匙能在几以内被恢复的结果表演由执行 12 CPA 攻击纪录。看起来仍然在 DECIMv2 的设计有一些缺点,因此,一些进一步的改进应该被做抵抗建议攻击。
Power analysis has been a powerful and thoroughly studied threat for implementations of block ciphers and public key algorithms but not yet for stream ciphers. Based on the consumed power differences between two neighboring clock cycles, this paper presents a correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on the synchronous stream cipher DECIM^v2 (the tweaked version of the original submission DECIM). This attack resynchronizes the cryptographic device ceaselessly with many different initialization values (IVs) to obtain enough power traces. Then by modeling the statistical properties of the differential power traces with the correlation coefficients, the proposed attack algorithm can completely reveal the secret key of DECIM^v2. Furthermore, a simulation attack is mounted to confirm the validity of the algorithm. The results show that the entire secret key of DECIM^v2 can be restored within several minutes by performing 12 CPA attacks. It seems that there are still some defects in the design of DECIM^v2 and thus some further improvements should be made to resist the proposed attack.