中文摘要：

市场危机通常会引发标志性的监管,所谓乱世用重典。文章关注于中国审计市场标志性的＂从业权取缔＂型监管事件,在为该事件构建了从＂舞弊警示＂到＂基于财务风险的市场溢酬和审计费用敏感度提升＂的分析框架后,文章的检验提供了关键性的经验证据：其一,较之普通公司,财务风险高的公司表现出明显的市场溢酬;其二,警示性的市场溢酬越高,后续的审计费用对财务风险的敏感度越强。综合结果表明,实现行业协会和外部监管部门对从业权的共治,并决定其是否取缔的模式,能够通过惩罚机会主义行为影响投资者的信念和从业者的执业格局,这为新兴审计市场监管的积极意义提供了证据。

英文摘要：

Market crises usually result in iconic regulation, and it is said that heavy penalties are carried out in trouble times. This paper focuses on the iconic regulation event of disqualification from audit business, and con structs an analytical framework from fraud warning to the increase in the sensibility of abnormal returns and audit fees based on financial risks. It arrives at the following critical evidence： firstly, firms with high financial risks have obvious abnormal returns~ secondly,higher warning abnormal re turns lead to greater sensibility of audit fees to financial risks. It suggests that the cogovernance of audit qualification and the determination of dis qualification modes by industry associations and external regulatory authori ties can affect the beliefs of investors and the practice pattern of audit practi tioners through the punishment on opportunistic behavior, which provides evidence for the regulation in emerging audit markets.