中文摘要：

基于成熟资本市场的研究表明,高声誉券商会抑制IPO公司的盈余管理.本文以2001-2011年处于中国制度环境下的IPO公司为样本,重新考察了券商声誉与IPO公司盈余管理之间的关系.研究发现,券商声誉越高,其所承销IPO公司的盈余管理程度也就越高,但券商声誉与IPO公司盈余管理程度之间的正向关系只有在投资者法律保护较差的地区才显著.进一步的研究还发现,高声誉券商纵容或协助IPO公司盈余管理的重要动因在于获取更高的经济收益.尽管高声誉券商确实能够降低IPO公司的抑价率,但这是通过提高IPO公司盈余管理程度的途径来实现的.本文的结论表明,要使我国资本市场中的券商声誉机制发挥作用,还需要大力提高券商机会主义行为所面临的法律风险.

英文摘要：

Evidence from the developed capital markets shows that underwriter reputation can be used to restrain the earning management of IPO companies. This restraining relationship is reexamined with the samples of IPO companies from 2001 to 2011 in China. A different result is found that underwriter reputation is ineffective in restraining the earning management of IPO companies,and that the positive relationship between them is significant under the poor investor protection areas. Moreover,in order to get a higher underwriting fee,the higher-reputed underwriters may even help the IPO companies to gain a larger room in earning management.Obviously,in order for the mechanism of underwriter reputation to work effectively,China’s market needs to be better self-disciplined,and the legal risks needs to be raised against the opportunism behavior of the underwriters especially.