中文摘要：

随着信息技术的发展，传统经济中普遍采用的单一定价策略采用者正在逐渐减少，尤其在具有网络外部性特征的产业中，更多地采用歧视定价策略．针对具有网络外部性的产业中双寡头垄断厂商的定价策略选择行为，将传统Hotelling模型中外生的定价策略作为内生变量，分析了厂商对单一定价和歧视定价的战略选择．模型的子博弈精炼Nash均衡表明：当网络效应不存在时，厂商或者同时采用单一定价，或者同时采用歧视定价；当网络效应存在时，由于网络效应的影响，厂商选择歧视定价的均衡条件放宽，导致厂商采用歧视定价比单一定价更具有成本优势，从而增强了厂商选择歧视定价的趋向．另一方面，若消费者对产品特征的敏感程度加强．也促使厂商选择歧视定价．

英文摘要：

Based on the Hotelling model with endogenous pricing strategy, this paper analyzes the pricing strategy choice of firms with network externality in the game of duopoly setting. Firms can choose uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The results show that firms choose either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing when the network effect does not exist. However, when the network effect exists, the equilibrium condition of discriminatory pricing is relaxed. Discriminatory pricing has a cost advantage. As a result, firms prefer discriminatory pricing. Meanwhile, if the consumers pay more attention to the product＇ s characters, more firms will choose discriminatory pricing .