欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
考虑了由一个供应商和多个零售商构成的两级供应链系统，在随机需求下，通过共同补给期进行协调的问题．作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者，供应商给出共同补给期策略，零售商作为跟随者以最优库存策略响应，建立了确定共同补给期和相应价格折扣模型．通过数值实例对该模型进行分析，得出Stackelberg均衡解，达到Pareto最优．
英文摘要：
We consider two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and multi-retailer. Under stochastic demand, the coordinating by means of common replenishment periods is studied. As the Stackelberg game＇s leader, supplier. establishes the model to determine common repienishment periods and corresponding pricing discount, while the buyers are the follower responding with the optimal stock policy. A numerical example is conducted to analyze the model and compute the Stackelberg equilibrium solution, and the result is Pareto optimal.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
位置：