中文摘要：

新兴资本市场代理冲突及信息不对称问题较为严重,为减少企业过度投资问题,从公司内部治理与外部监督两方面对其进行分析。研究结果表明：高质量的财务报告和短期债务的大量运用能够有效缓解企业的过度投资;财务报告质量与较多运用短期债务之间具有相互替代作用,而较多运用短期债务的公司,财务报告质量对过度投资的缓解作用低于短期债务较少的公司。

英文摘要：

The agency conflict and information asymmetry problem are more serious in emerging capital market. In order to alleviating the overinvestment, we analyze the company from the internal corporate governance and external supervision. The results show that the improvement of FRQ and short term debt can relieve companies＂ overinvestment significantly. When alleviating overinvestment, FRQ and short-term debt have mutual substitution. In the companies of those who use more short-term debt, mitigation effect of FRQ is lower.