中文摘要：

遵循产权结构—行为—绩效的产权经济学分析路径,对国内地方政府主导的度假区治理结构有效性进行了理论解释,进而提出中国旅游度假区治理结构优化的方向。研究发现,地方政府治理结构难以实现度假区产权的排他性界定,且难以形成效率优先的度假区管理者选拔和退出机制;地方政府治理结构隐含着非对称的度假区产权结构,在畸形激励机制和外部监督机制缺位的情况下,本届政府倾向于利用度假区稀缺的土地资源获取短期开发利益,度假区发展的长远利益和目标难以得到制度保证。中央政府主导治理模式和外部监督下企业一体化开发模式是中国旅游度假区治理结构优化的两种路径。

英文摘要：

The paper gives theoretical analysis on the validity of local government dominated resort governance through property rights economics perspective,pointing out the direction of domestic tourist resort governance optimization.The paper finds out three main conclusions regarding on the defects of local government dominated resort governance,following the path of property rights structure,behavior and performance.Firstly,property rights of resort development can not be exclusively allocated and defined,thus leading to the tragedy of commons.Secondly,the principle of choosing and dismissing leading officer of resort is usually inefficient.Thirdly,local government is always improperly motivated to act in a short term under the unmatched resort property rights structure and lacks supervision.Thus,the long run goal of resort development can not be achieved institutionally.There are two ways to make resort governance optimized.One is model of central government governance,and the other is corporate integrated governance under external supervision.