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政策闸门、潮涌通道与发展机会——一个新结构经济学视角下的最优政府干预程度理论
  • ISSN号:1001-9952
  • 期刊名称:《财经研究》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]
  • 作者机构:北京大学新结构经济学研究中心,北京100871
  • 相关基金:国家社科基金青年项目(15CJL025);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2015M580898)
作者: 付才辉
中文摘要:

投资潮涌和产能过剩是发展中国家在快速结构变迁过程中出现的重要现象。基于新结构经济学的视角,通过剖析该现象文章构建了一个最优政府干预程度理论:首先,由于处于前沿内部,发展中经济体的结构变迁具有后发优势;其次,后发优势所蕴含的发展机会具有社会共识但信息不完全,从而会导致市场自身出现协调困难,进而使得市场主体面临投资潮涌而导致亏损的风险,从而对发展机会谨小慎微;最后,市场的谨小慎微则会导致对发展机会的利用不足,政府会实施积极的发展政策组合对市场的价格、成本与利润进行干预,以增强对市场的激励和放松约束,其结果虽然能使得发展机会得到更充分的利用,但与此同时也会导致更加严重的产能过剩。据此理论,文章主张发展政策不能够因噎废食,理性的做法是利害权衡,把握好最优的干预程度。

英文摘要:

It is a very important phenomenon that investment wave and excess capacity occur in the process of quick structural change in developing countries.From the perspective of new structural economics,this paper constructs a theory of optimal government intervention degree based on the exploration of this phenomenon.Firstly,there is a latemover advantage in the structural change in the developing economies because of their location in interior frontier.Secondly,the development opportunities embedded in the latemover advantage have the social consensus but incomplete information,thereby resulting in coordination difficulties of the market and thus the risks of losses resulting from investment wave that face market subjects and timid overcautious development opportunities.Finally,market timidity and cautiousness lead to insufficient usage of development opportunities,and governments implement active development policy combination to intervene prices,costs and profits in the market for the purpose of the enhancement of market incentives and the relaxation of constraints,but as a result,although development opportunities can be made more full use of,excess capacity becomes more severe in the meantime.Accordingly,this paper advocates that development policy cannot give up eating for fear of choking,and the rational practice is to make a tradeoff between gains and losses and grasp optimal intervention degree.

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期刊信息
  • 《财经研究》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:中华人民共和国教育部
  • 主办单位:上海财经大学
  • 主编:樊丽明
  • 地址:上海市武东路321号乙
  • 邮编:200434
  • 邮箱:cjyj@mail.shuofe.edu.cn
  • 电话:021-65904345
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1001-9952
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:31-1012/F
  • 邮发代号:4-331
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2004版),中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国社科基金资助期刊,中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库,中国北大核心期刊(2000版)
  • 被引量:30167