中文摘要：

本文建立了一个“多重委托一代理”体系下规制需求的简约模型，解释了权力配置、供给成本和规制者竞争与需求的关系。基于典型化事实和统计描述的经验分析发现．“强势规制者——信息产业部”基于有效制度供给对企业提供的各种庇护，在增加企业规制需求的同时．也引发了与其他监管部门的权力竞争．最终导致自身规制供给效率的下降；相反，“弱规制者——电监会”不拥有实质性的监管权力。其主导的市场化改革还会侵蚀垄断运营商的既得利益，缺乏实际的规制需求。在以增强政府间接控制力、节省监管成本为导向的新一轮机构改革中，它们被撤销或合并就成为一种必然。独立规制实践的起落．也受制于中国特殊的“政治-经济-行政-垄断”模式．未来垄断产业监管体系的改革和优化．必须以考虑中国要素和背景为前提。

英文摘要：

This paper established a framework of the regulatory demand under the system of ＂multiple principal-agent＂, and aims to analysis the cycles of the independent regulatory agents from the views such as governance authority arrangement, regulator＇s utilities function and monopoly＇s institutional demand. Test the theoretical assumption with the stylized facts and statistical description of the MII （Ministry of Information Industry） and SERC （State Electricity Regulatory Commission）, the research found： MII as a stronger regulator who can protect the monopoly by effective institution factor and increase more demand from later, while this also induce the competition from other governance agent and reduce the regulatory efficiency. On the other hand, SERC as a weaker governance shortage the key regulatory power, its reform proposition will affect the vested group＇s interest, thus SERC could not get support from electricity monopoly operator. When face the new round institutional system reform aim to enhance the government comprehensive intervention capabilities and decrease the agents cost, those two agents will be undo and merger. The studies also show that the independent regulatory agents reform practice up and down limited by the China＇s special ＂politic-administration-economy-monopoly ＂institutional structure, so the monopoly industry future governance mechanism design must consider those elements and background.