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中文摘要：
基于需求不确定性环境，构建两个制造商、两个排他性零售商构成的链与链价格竞争模型，识别了纵向联盟的形成机制及制造商与零售商收益分享合同的选择范围，并分析了产品竞争、价格风险对联盟及收益分享合同选择的影响．研究结论表明，联盟的选择不受价格风险的影响而取决于产品的竞争强度，但基于联盟的零售商收益分享比例范围将随着价格波动的增加而逐渐提高．
英文摘要：
This paper proposed chain to chain price competition models defined by two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers under demand uncertainty. We identified the valid mechanism for vertical alliances formation and the range of revenue sharing contracts, and also analyzed the impact of product competition and price risk on the choice of alliances and revenue sharing contract. The results suggest that the alliances are dependent on the intensity of product competition whereas independent of price risk. However, the proportion range for retailer revenue sharing contract based on the alliances will increase with the price risk.
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