中文摘要：

本文从事后的角度研究企业出现财务困境后银行贷款的动态调整。实证研究发现：（1）银行的事后监督主要通过调整长期借款实现；（2）银行调减困境公司的长期借款，对国有和民营公司的调减幅度差异不显著，国有企业在陷入困境当年有一定的信贷优惠，但是随着时间的推移优惠逐渐消失；（3）长期借款的调整是一次调整，而不是逐年调整，且调整的方向和幅度与公司财务指标显著相关；（4）长期借款调增的困境公司，其EBIT增长率明显高于调减或调平的公司。本文的研究结果表明，对首次陷入财务困境的公司，我国银行通过调整长期借款增强了对债务人的约束，已发挥其相应的公司治理作用。

英文摘要：

This paper discusses the dynamic adjustment of distressed firms＇ bank loans in an ex post perspective, and our empir- ical study finds that： （1）The post-supervision of Chinese commercial bank is carded out mainly through the adjustment of long-term loans; （2）Banks reduce the long-term loans of distressed companies, and such adjustment doesn＇t differ significantly from state-owned to private companies;（3）Adjustments of long-term loans are made once instead of year-by-year, having a sig- nificant correlation with financial indicators; （4）Distressed companies with their long- term loans reduced or unchanged get a lower rate of EBIT growth compared with those getting increased long-term loans support. In conclusion, for companies falling in financial distress for the first time, adjustment of long-term loans enhances Chinese commercial banks＇ constraint over debt- ors and plays a correspondent role in corporate governance.