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中文摘要：
在现有相关研究成果的基础上,在假设公司高管人员过度自信的条件下,建立恰当数学模型研究上市公司高管人员过度自信对公司股利分配决策和外部融资决策的影响机理。研究结果表明,当上市公司高管人员对未来经营环境比较乐观时,其现金股利分配水平和债务融资数量将随着其过度自信程度的提高而增多;当上市公司高管人员对未来经营环境比较悲观时,其现金股利分配水平和债务融资数量将随着其过度自信程度的提高而减少。上市公司的现金股利分配水平和债务融资数量随着公司股票价格上涨和债务融资利息率上升而减少;股权融资数量随着公司股票价格上涨和债务融资利息率上升而增加。论文研究工作在理论上扩展和深化了Deshmukh、Goe和Howe等人的相关研究成果。
英文摘要：
On the basis of the current related research results,under the hypotheses condition that senior managers of listed companies are overconfident,this paper sets up an appropriate mathematical model to study the effect mechanism of the senior manager＇s overconfident psychological preference on the dividend payout policy and the external financing decision of firm theoretically.The results show that,when the senior manager of listed company is optimistic about the future business environment,the cash dividend and debt financing amount of listed company would increase in his/her overconfidence;and when senior manager of listed company is pessimistic about the future business environment,the cash dividend and debt financing amount of listed company would decrease in his/her overconfidence.The cash dividend and debt financing amount of listed company would decrease in the company＇s stock price and the interest rate of debt financing fund;and the equity financing amount of listed company would increase in the company＇s stock price and the interest rate of debt financing fund.This paper reasonably expands and deepens the related research results obtained by Deshmukh,Goe and Howe theoretically.
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