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中文摘要：
解决公司中的委托代理问题和有效监督管理层需要各种治理机制共同发挥作用。利用2002年～2005年中国上市公司的平衡面板数据，研究大股东股权竞争、董事会构成、经营者股权激励和监事会行为4种公司治理机制的互动关系。实证结果显示，大股东股权竞争与董事会构成之间存在替代效应，大股东股权竞争与经营者股权激励、董事会构成与监事会行为之间存在互补效应，这表明中国上市公司的治理机制关系呈现出复杂的特性。这一研究结论为继续深化中国的公司治理改革提供了经验证据，提高公司治理水平需要理顺各种公司治理机制的关系，实现治理机制的协同发展。
英文摘要：
Corporate governance mechanisms play a corporative role in resolving the principal - agent problems and effectively monitor the top management. Using the panel data of Chinese listed firms during 2002 - 2005, this study makes an empirical test on the interaction relationship among four kinds of governance mecha- nisms, viz. the fight for ownership among large shareholders, beard composition, managerial ownership and supervisory beard behavior. The empirical results show that the substitution effect exists between the fight for ownership among large shareholders and beard composition： moreover, the complement effect exists not only between the fight for ownership among large shareholders and managerial ownership but also between board composition and supervisory beard behavior. These indicate that the relationship among ,Carious corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese listed companies is greatly complicated. The results provide some empirical evidences for improving the reform of corporate governance in China. In order to improve corporate governance, all relationship among multiple governance mechanisms needs to be arranged to achieve the coordinated development.
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