中文摘要：

由土地资源属性和制度决定，国有土地供应出让中形成了受到土地利用规划约束和上级政府管制，由数百个城市“寡头厂商”组成的土地一级供应市场，并产生了诸多策略行为和机会主义做法。本文运用2003-2008年282个城市面板数据的单方程和联立方程空间计量模型，检验了城市政府围绕土地供应市场份额的策略互动影响、土地信贷融资和土地出让垄断利润的数量关系，并据此构造目标供应量、实际收益和惩罚三者相结合博弈策略选择空间，以形成激励地方政府改善土地供应的财政约束机制。

英文摘要：

Constrained by the propernes oi tanu state-owned land supply and transfer have formed the primary supply market composed of hundreds city-based oligopolistic enterprises, which is also subject to the land-use planning constraints and the regulation of higher-level governments, leading to strategic and oppor- tunistic behavior. Using single and simultaneous spatial econometric models based on the panel data of 282 cities in China from 2003 to 2008, this paper examines the strategic interac- tion among local governments concerning relative market share and the quantitative relation- ship between land credit financing and monopolistic profits of land transfer, and accordingly constructs a strategy choice space with the combination of target supply, real benefits and penalties, in order to form fiscal restraint mechanism which encourages local governments＇ improvement of land supply.