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中文摘要：
通过构建实物期权模型,研究了在大股东控制下,拥有成长期权的公司的投资时机决策及其对公司价值的影响,并进一步分析了产生影响的内在机理.研究表明：（1）受控制权利益驱动的大股东会产生偏离公司价值最大化目标的延迟投资行为.（2）当公司拥有成长期权时,成长期权对大股东的偏离公司价值最大化目标的投资行为具有缓解作用,可以使大股东投资时机与公司价值最大化目标更趋接近.（3）成长因子越大,大股东所持股份越多,成长期权对大股东延迟投资行为产生的缓解作用越强,大股东投资时机与公司价值最大化投资时机越接近,在此过程中公司价值上升.最后,对上述结论进行了数值模拟分析和解释.
英文摘要：
Using real option methods,this paper studies the influence of growth options on investment timing decision and Corp value under large shareholder control settings.It shows that firstly,delay-investment timing behavior is found under private benefits of control settings;secondly,alleviating effects of growth options are found in these settings,thus large shareholders＇ investment decision is closer to the Corp value aim;thirdly,the greater the growth parameter is,the more the large shareholders hold shares,the stronger the alleviating effects on large shareholders＇ delay-investment timing behavior,and corp value will increase while investment timing difference between large shareholder and corporation are more and more equalized.At last,this paper gave numerical simulations to show the results and provided justifiable explanations for above results.
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