中文摘要：

本文在跨期的预付金模型理论基础之上，考察典型代理人效用最大化和政府损失函数最小化下铸币税和财政税收之间理论关系，分析显示通货膨胀率和税率相关性可正可负，其结论不同于“曼昆原则”。进一步研究显示政府支出对通货膨胀率与税率斜率的影响为负，预付金对通货膨胀率与税率的斜率影响也可正可负。本文实证结果表明税率和通货膨胀率正相关，但其内在机制不同于“曼昆原则”。实证显示政府支出对通货膨胀率与税率的斜率影响为负，预付金对通货膨胀率与税率的斜率影响为正，结果支持典型代理人效用最大化和政府损失函数最小化下模型的结论。

英文摘要：

On the basis of the intertemporal cash-in-advance model, the paper explores the theoretical relationship between seigniorage and the fiscal tax under the condition of the representative agent utility maximization and the loss function minimization of the government. The theoretical analysis shows the correlation could be positive or negative between the tax rate and the inflation rate, which is different from Mankiw principle. Furthermore, the research shows the slope of the inflation rate and the tax rate is negative under the impact of the government spending, and the slope can also be positive or the cash in advance. The empirical results the internal mechanism is different from the slope of the inflation rate and the rate negative in response to the movement of show that the correlation is positive, but that of Mankiw principle. It reveals that is negative against the impact of the government spending and positive against that of the cash in advance. The results support the conclusions under the representative agent utility maximization and the loss function minimization of the government.