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中文摘要：
大、小股东委托代理冲突问题反映在企业的投资决策上就是，大股东为追求控制权私有收益而产生的过度投资和投资不足两种非效率投资行为。本文的研究通过建立模型，将过度投资与投资不足两种非效率投资行为纳入到同一个框架下，探讨了大股东控制条件下的不同控制权配置方式及其企业非效率投资行为。结果表明：基于对控制权私有收益的追求，过度投资和投资不足两种非效率投资行为同时存在于大股东控制条件下的企业投资行为中；绝对控股条件下的企业投资行为，会随着控制性大股东的所有权比例变化而呈现出不同的非效率投资行为的特征；多个大股东相互监督或合谋都会同时缓解过度投资，以及加强投资不足，且合谋对企业非效率投资行为的影响取决于合谋成本的大小。
英文摘要：
Conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder, emerging in the form of firm＇ s investment policy, is the two kinds of inefficient investment behaviors due to the controlling shareholder＇ s pursuit of private benefit of control：the over-investment and the investment-deficiency. Considering both the over-investment and investment-deficiency in one framework by setting up models, we study the controlling power allocation and the inefficient investment behaviors in the ownership structure of large shareholder controlling. It is shown that, because of the pursuit of private benefit of control, the two classes of inefficient investment behaviors exist in the investment behaviors of the large shareholder controlling firms. The investment behavior varies with the weight of ownership of the controlling shareholder. Both the balancing and the cooperation between several large shareholders could alleviate the over-investment and aggravate the investment-deficiency, and the effect of cooperation on the inefficient investment behaviors depends on the cost of the cooperation.
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