中文摘要：

本文以我国上市公司为样本，考察了冗员负担对高管激励机制的影响。研究发现，在国有企业中，冗员负担显著降低了高管的薪酬与企业业绩之间的敏感性，加剧了薪酬的“粘性”程度，促使高管进行了更多的在职消费；但没有证据表明在非国有企业中存在上述现象。研究结果表明：政府干预所导致的冗员负担的存在对国有企业的高管激励机制产生了重要影响，具体表现为政府会弱化高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的关联性，同时允许高管进行较多的在职消费，用以弥补高管在现金薪酬方面的损失。本文的结论在一定程度上可以为国有企业高管激励效果不佳、在职消费等隐性激励方式广泛存在的现象提供较合理的解释。本文丰富了国有企业高管激励机制的影响因素及企业冗员的经济后果方面的文献，对我国的国企改革具有重要的借鉴意义。

英文摘要：

This paper examines the impact of redundancy burden on the executive incentive mechanism by em ploying the data of listed companies in Chinese equity market. The analysis reveals that redundancy burden sig nificantly reduces the compensation performance sensitivity of executives in state owned enterprises （SOEs） and increases the degree of compensation stickiness leading to more perquisite consumption of executives. How ever, there is no evidence to support this conclusion in nonSOEs. The results indicate that government has great responsibility to redundancy of SOEs and it has a significant impact on the design of executive incentive mechanism but it has limited impact on that of nonSOEs. Therefore, there are significant differences of the im pact of redundancy burden on the executive incentive mechanism between SOEs and nonSOEs. Our findings have important implication to the relationship between property rights and corporate performance, the formation mechanism of redundancy, and the impact of redundancy burden on executive incentive mechanism.