表外负债是介于法律边界的融资方式,现行会计准则下,它可以使上市公司在不增加账面债务信息的情况下获得融资.但巴塞尔协议将其信用风险转换系数核定为100%,可见表外负债给上市公司与会计信息使用者带来了巨大隐性风险.本文通过实证研究发现表外负债信息的披露与会计信息质量显著正相关,即自愿披露表外负债信息的上市公司具有较高的会计信息质量;而同样作为融资替代方式的商业信用与表外负债显著正相关,也就是说商业信用可以作为表外负债信息识别与监管的易获取替代变量.这对于如何提高会计信息质量有一定的启示,并且为现实条件限制下监管部门强化表外负债监察和职能部门优化风险管控,以及外部利益相关者识别表外负债风险提供了可信依据.
Off-balance sheet liability is a financing method which exists in the legal boundary. Under our current accounting standards, off-balance sheet liability can enable listed companies to obtain addi- tional financing without increasing the amount of debt on the finan- cial statement, at the same time, it will increase the potential risk for the listed companies. However, the Basle Accord approved its credit risk conversion coefficient of a hundred percent, it is thus clear that off-balance sheet liability can bring enormous potential implicit risks for both listed companies and the other accounting information users. Through the empirical research, this paper has found the following several important conclusions. First of all, the relation between the disclosure of off-balance sheet liability and the quality of the account- ing information has significant positive correlation, that is to say the listed companies which voluntarily discle of off-balance sheet liability have a higher quality of accounting information, on the contrary, oth- ers have a lower quality of accounting information. For another, the commercial credit which is an alternative financing method also has significant positive correlation with the off-balance sheet liability, in other words, commercial credit which is easier to access can be used as a substitution variable to identify, supervise and control the off-bal- ance sheet liability. At last, we believe that our theoretical analysis and research will give some enlightenment and promotion to how to improve the quality of accounting information. In the meantime, we hope that this paper can provide reliable basis for both the supervision department and other functional departments to strengthen the mon- itor of the off-balance sheet liability and to optimize the management and to control the risks under the limitation of existing laws and reg- ulations. Also, we hope that our study can provide a reference for the external stakeholders to identify the risk of off-balance sheet liability.