中文摘要：

在由单个制造商和强弱零售商组成的供应链中，给出三种博弈时机下的均衡结果求解过程，然后探讨定价权转移、促销转移，以及从众行为对均衡结果的影响；研究供应链的内生时机，并通过数值仿真探讨卖场流量对成员决策和内生时机的影响。研究结果表明：在三种博弈时机下，制造商通过促销转移能够与弱势零售商分享强势零售商的部分利润，此时从众行为降低了强势零售商利润；强势零售商领导是供应链内生时机，并且卖场流量不影响这种内生时机。

英文摘要：

Based on transfer of wholesale pricing power and consumers herd behavior, this paper gives solving processes of equilibrium results under three games timing, and then explores the effects of transfer of pricing power, promotional transfer and herd behavior on equilibrium results. Finally, it studies endogenous timing of competing supply chains, and explores the effects of operating costs and store traffic on member decision and endogenous timing through numerical simulations. The study shows that manufacturer can share some of dominant retailer＇ s profits with weak retailer through promotional transfer under three games timing. At this moment, dominant retailer＇ s profits decrease with the enhancement of herd behavior. Dominant retailer Stackelberg is endogenous timing of supply chains, which is affected by store traffic.