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中文摘要：
本文在银行治理的理论架构下，对政府作为银行股东作用于银行风险的机制进行了理论分析，并采用山东、河南两省29家中小商业银行的调查数据进行了实证检验。实证结果表明，银行第1大股东的性质并没有对银行风险产生显著影响，政府以股东身份对银行（董事会）的控制起到了降低银行风险的明显效果，这表明政府股东对银行业影响的发展观点（而不是政治观点）对中国的中小银行更有解释力。
英文摘要：
The paper theoretically studies the mechanism of government as shareholder of commercial banks on their risk control under the theoretical framework of bank governance, and make an empirical analysis by using 29 medium and small commercial banks＇data from Shandong and Henan provinces. The conclusion is that the nature of bank shareholders does not play an important role in controlling its risk, yet government as a shareholder in bank management does lower its risk significantly, which shows that development approach （ not political approach） of government influence on bank gives a better explanation for Chinese medium and small commercial banks.
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