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中文摘要：
虚假广告的产生来源于商家与消费者之间存在的信息不对称及信息搜寻存在成本,使得商家在发布虚假广告与信息时消费者往往不能正确地识别。虚假广告的存在导致市场中会出现柠檬市场的效应,使劣质产品占领了市场。基于博弈论的分析得到以下结论：政府对广告信息发布的监督概率与其对虚假广告与信息的发布者的惩罚因子具有替代性;如果制造商通过发布虚假信息所获取的利润越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率;政府的监督概率与发布虚假信息的成本成负相关的关系;如果制造商发布的虚假信息量越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率。
英文摘要：
The source of exaggerated advertisement comes from the asymmetric information between merchants and consumers and the cost of information searching, which often makes the consumers hold a wrong belief about the product after the releasing of the exaggerated advertisement. Exaggerated advertisement leads to the effect of lemon market, thus cause inferior products occupying the market. Based on game-theory analysis, we have the following conclusions： firstly, the probability of the government supervision on advertisement releasing is alternative to the punishing factor of the releaser of exaggerated advertisement and information; secondly, the more profit the manufacturer obtains from exaggerated advertisement, the more probability of its supervision the government should try to strengthen ; thirdly, relationship between the probability of the government supervision and the cost of exaggerated information releasing is contrary; fourthly, the government should try their hard to strengthen the supervi- sion if manufacturers publication of exaggerated information is greater.
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