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中文摘要：
管理者进行金融衍生品市场的非排它性股权互换交易会降低报酬合约的事后激励强度,并对企业价值和风险产生影响.本文在管理者可同时影响企业风险和企业价值的条件下,构建基于股权互换避险交易的管理者激励薪酬动态博弈模型.结果表明,当管理者投入产出效率高于某临界值时,互换避险的存在不会降低激励合约的强度;否则激励合约强度的减弱程度随努力成本、交易方风险厌恶以及交易成本而减小;随风险选择成本、管理者能力以及其风险厌恶而增大.均衡的激励强度随管理者努力和风险选择成本、管理者和交易方风险厌恶以及交易成本减小.当风险内生时,高的企业风险和激励报酬强度未必强化管理层互换交易动机.最后结合现实分析了本文的研究价值和意义.
英文摘要：
Managerial hedging by non-exclusive equity swaps can reduce ex post incentive of the contract,and affect the firm value and risk thereafter.Under the assumption that the manager can affect both the firm value and firm risk simultaneously,we analyze dynamic game equilibrium of the incentive contract and non-exclusive equity swaps contract.The results indicate that when the efficiency of the manager＇s effort exceeds a key point,hedging will not reduce the incentive.Otherwise,the degree of reduced equilibrium incentive is decreasing with the cost of effort,risk aversion of trading party and trading cost,but is increasing with the cost of risk control,the capability and risk aversion of the manager.The optimal incentive is decreasing with both costs of effort and risk control,the risk aversions of the manager and trading party,and the trading cost;Further,we find the optimal trading size is not always increasing with risk aversion of managers and the incentive in the presence of endogenous firm risk.Finally,with the practice of stock-based compensation,we illustrate the meaning and importance of our research.
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