中文摘要：

为应对日趋激烈的酒店市场竞争、加强对销售渠道的控制,酒店急需与推广商合作以提高自有销售网站的需求水平。文章基于推广成本信息不对称,构建了一个占主导的酒店和一家推广商关于需求推广合作的博弈模型,分析了信息不对称情形下推广商的谎报动机,指出合作契约设计的必要性。并提出一套契约菜单,在保证推广商依据自身实际成本类型进行契约选择的前提下,实现了酒店利润的最大化。最后通过算例分析,验证了所设计的合作契约的有效性,并给出了参数灵敏性分析。

英文摘要：

To cope with the increasing competition of hotels and strengthen the control of sales channels,there is an urgent need for hotels to improve the demand in their own sales website. Based on asymmetric promotion cost information,we develop a game model on demand promotion cooperation between a dominant hotel and a promoter,analyse the promoter＇ s incentive of misreporting and point out the necessity of contract design. We propose a contract menu which can maximize profit of hotel and make the promoter choose the contract that is designed for his type. Finally we validate the effectiveness of this contract and show the sensitivity analysis of parameters through numerical examples.