中文摘要：

文章从利益相关者共同参与农村水利管理的角度出发，以浙江省为例进行实证研究，运用动态博弈均衡模型分析了乡政府与水利站、水利站与村委会、村委会与农户、农户与农户之间的利益博弈，发现通过降低乡政府的监管成本、降低水利站的额外成本、加大对村委会的惩罚及给农户以适当的奖励等均衡策略都能提高各利益相关者的参与度，分析结果为改善浙江省农村水利市场化管理模式提供了战略思考与政策建议。

英文摘要：

This paper takes the rural water conservancy of Zhejiang Province as an example, and analyzes the interest game between the town-government and the water station, the water station and the village commit- tee, the village committee and the peasant householder, and the peasant householder A and the peasant house- holder B based on the dynamic game equilibrium model. It finds the main factors that influence the game equi- librium, which are related with decreasing the town government regulatory cost and the water station extra cost as well as reinforcing the punishment on the village committee and offering proper sum of bonus to the peasant householders, which will actually improve each stakeholder＇s degree of involvement in it. Finally, some equi- librium strategies to improve the benefit of each stakeholder and the rural water conservancy management in Zhejiang Province are put up.