中文摘要：

由于双渠道供应链中电子渠道独立于零售商时，会存在“渠道冲突”，因此考虑制造商在电子渠道领域和零售商进行合作，把电子渠道的订单全部交由零售商来完成，收益共享，建立了基于Stackelberg博弈的理论模型．分析发现电子渠道的需求不受零售商是否合作的影响，对一个简化情形，得到了制造商和零售商选择在电子渠道合作的解析条件．通过算例仿真，探讨了电子渠道独立于零售商时的批发价格和制造商的电子渠道收益分享比例对合作的影响，发现某些情形下制造商电子渠道和零售商合作为最优策略．

英文摘要：

In the dual-channel supply chain, if manufacturer＇ electronic channels are independent of retailer, there will be ＂channel conflict＂. The cooperation between electronic channel and the retailer is studied, in which the retailer finishes all the electronic channel＇ orders, and the manufacturer and the retailer share electronic channel＇ revenue. By a Stackelberg game theoretical model, the analysis shows that retailer＇ cooperation choice has no effect on electronic channel＇ demand. In a simplified case the analytical conditions of that the manufacturer and the retailer choose cooperation in the electronic channel are obtained. When the electronic channel is independent of the retailer, the effects of the wholesale price and manufacturer＇ sharing proportion on cooperation are investigated by numerical examples, it is found that in some cases the manufacturer＇ electronic channel and the retailer choose cooperation is the optimal strategy.