NGUYENLH在博弈论思想的指导下来对身份认证协议进行了修改,协议参与方在进行协议交互之前以一定的概率口来发送无用数据,使得攻击者攻击协议所获得的收益比不攻击协议所获得的收益还要小,以此保证了协议的安全性。但该方案存在2个缺陷:考虑的攻击者过于强大,且仅仅考虑了其收益,忽略了其发起攻击所要消耗的代价;没有考虑诚实节点在什么条件下才会选择发送无用数据。针对这2个缺陷对NGUYENLH方案进行改进,给出了更具有一般意义的a值。同时引入了攻击概率β,给出了诚实节点发送无用数据的前提条件以及在不同的β值下口的取值范围。相对于原方案,改进方案的结论更具有一般性,且更全面。同时,通过P2P下面的一个具体案例分析证明了所提结论的正确性。
Using the ideas of game theory, NGUYEN L H transformed two families of authentication protocols where the honest party transmitted some useless data with probability before the normal protocol run, so that even if an attacker attacks a protocol, the attacker's payoff will still be lower than that when it does not. In such a way, the security of the protocol was guaranteed. However, this scheme suffers from two shortcomings: the considered is too attacker powerful, and only its payoff was considered and the cost of the attacks was ignored; the situation in which the honest node would choose to send useless data was not considered. To improve this scheme, the value of a, with the consideration of the attack cost, of which the value is more general was given. What's more, the attack probability fl was introduced. Based on this, the precondition that the honest node transmits the useless data was presented, as well as the value of a under the different β values. Compared with the original scheme, this results are more generic and comprehensive. Mean while, through a case analysis in the P2P network, the correctness of the conclusion is proved.