中文摘要：

笔者考查具有风险厌恶偏好的由生产商主导的两级供应链，利用均值方差方法分析利润分享契约机制对供应链协调的影响，提出了考虑风险因素情况下的利润分享契约机制，得出集中决策下供应链达成协调的充要条件。笔者讨论分散决策情况的斯塔克尔伯格博弈均衡解，并通过数值分析研究验证：分散决策时无法实现供应链的协调。相比较于风险中性的情况，风险厌恶假设下供应链的收益会产生效率损失，而且成员越厌恶风险，损失越大。

英文摘要：

This paper studies a manufacturer-dominated two-level supply chain both with risk-aversion preference by exploring the use of profit sharing contract for coordinating supply chains under the mean-variance （MV） decision framework. It is found that there exists a unique equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with profit sharing contract in the decentralized case. A numerical analysis indicates that the channel coordination is imposible in decentralization, there exisits supply chain efficiency loss under the risk-aversion assumption, the more risk-averse of the member, the less efficiency.