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社会破产成本、企业债务违约与信贷资金配置效率
  • ISSN号:1002-7246
  • 期刊名称:金融研究
  • 时间:2013.11.17
  • 页码:78-92
  • 分类:F830.91[经济管理—金融学]
  • 作者机构:[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, [2]微软中国公司
  • 相关基金:国家社科基金重点项目“我国资本市场系统稳定性评估和监测研究”(项目编号:11AZD010)
  • 相关项目:家族企业控制权配置的内生决定及其经济后果研究
中文摘要:

证券市场安全是一个需要引起高度重视的问题,而证券市场安全与证券监管有着密切的联系。本文根据心理学的一般原理,探讨了损失厌恶、代表性偏差和处置效应对证券监管的影响,并将结果与机构投资者的数据进行比较以发现证券监管者的非理性行为特征。实证结果发现:证券监管者中较高比例人群存在损失厌恶、高代表性偏差和处置效应倾向。此外,监管者在这三种非理性行为的表现中并不显著好于市场中的机构投资者,并且还具备比后者显著更高的损失厌恶倾向;监管者的损失厌恶与处置效应之间存在显著的相关性,而机构投资者的损失厌恶与处置效应之间则不存在显著的相关性;证券监管者的代表性偏差与处置效应之间存在显著的相关性,而机构投资者的代表性偏差与处置效应之间也存在显著的相关性。最后,根据本文的实证结果和分析,我们对如何改进监管效度提出了相关政策建议。

英文摘要:

The safety of security market is an issue which should be highly significant. Meanwhile,there is a close relationship between security market safety and securities regulation. According to principles of psychology,this essay explores whether loss aversion,representativeness bias and disposition effect affect securities regulation,and comparing the results with data of institutional investors in order to find the characteristics of security regulators' irrational behavior. In terms of empirical results,this paper finds that there are large proportion of people in the security regulators suffering from loss aversion,representativeness bias and disposition effect. Moreover,the extent of security regulators' rationality is not significant better than institutional investors; at the same time,security regulators have significantly higher lose aversion than institutional investors. For security regulators,there is significant correlation between loss aversion and disposition effect. However,there is no significant correlation between loss aversion and disposition effect for institutional investors.As for the correlation between disposition effect and representativeness bias,both of security regulators and institutional investors have significant correlation between them. Finally,according to the empirical results and analysis,this paper gives the policy suggestions how to improve validity of securities regulation.

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期刊信息
  • 《金融研究》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:中国人民银行
  • 主办单位:中国金融学会
  • 主编:徐忠
  • 地址:北京西城区成方街32号2号楼
  • 邮编:100800
  • 邮箱:
  • 电话:010-66195402 66194441
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1002-7246
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-1268/F
  • 邮发代号:2-637
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2004版),中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国社科基金资助期刊,中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库,中国北大核心期刊(2000版)
  • 被引量:56500