将股权激励、所有权结构、代理成本与投资效率纳入一个统一的分析框架,使用产权属性作为调节变量,代理成本作为中介变量,实证检验股权激励是否影响投资效率,以及股权激励、所有权结构、代理成本与投资效率之间的关系。结果表明:股权激励能够抑制上市公司的非效率投资,代理成本的中介效应显著,但所占比重很小,非国有企业的抑制作用大于国有企业,非国有企业的中介传导机制畅通;国有企业“期权激励”方式能够显著抑制非效率投资,非国有企业的非效率投资通过实施“股票激励”方式能够得到显著抑制;实施股权激励计划能够显著抑制上市公司的投资不足,非国有企业的抑制作用大于国有企业,非国有企业的代理成本中介效应机制畅通,国有上市公司的代理成本中介效应不显著。
This paper empirically tests whether equity incentive affects investment efficiency and relationship among equity incentives, ownership structure, agency costs and investment efficiency by taking these factors into an analytical framework, ownership as a mediation variable, and agency costs as mediating variables. The results show that: equity incentive inhibits inefficient investment of listed companies, media- tion effect of agency costs is significant, but proportion is very small, inhibition effect of non-state-owned enterprises is greater than that of state-owned ones, and mediation transmission mechanism for non-state- owned enterprises works well; "option incentive" approach significantly inhibits non-efficiency investments for state-owned enterprises, while non-efficient investments is significantly inhibited through "equity incentives" approach; implementation of equity incentive plans significantly inhibits under-investment, inhibition effect of non-state-owned enterprises is greater than that of state-owned ones, mediation effect transmission mechanism for non-state-owned enterprises works well, and the mediating effect of agency costs for state- owned companies is not significant.