在新产品需求为随机需求,再制造产品需求受销售价格影响的混合需求条件下,以博弈论为主要工具,研究了受专利保护的再制造闭环供应链的定价与协调问题,分析了集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的新产品最优订购量、废旧产品最优回收价格、最优专利许可费用、再制造品最优零售价格以及供应链的最优利润,并通过收益分享一费用分担契约对闭环供应链系统进行了协调,并通过数值算例验证了集中决策和分散决策情形下再制造成本节约对供应链成员的最优决策和利润的影响,以及收益分享.费用分担契约对闭环供应链的协调效果。研究表明再制造受专利保护的情况下,原制造商能通过专利许可费来影响第三方再制造商回收的废旧产品的回收价格和回收量,进而去影响原制造商和第三方再制造商的收益。
In this paper, the pricing and coordination problem of the patent-protected remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under mixed demand of stochastic new products ' demand and remanufactured products' price-dependent demand is studied using game theory. Through the analysis of two circumstances of centralized and decentralized decision-making, the optimal ordering quantity and wholesale price of new products, the optimal recycling price of waste products, the optimal patent licensing fees, the optimal retail price of remanufactured products and the optimal profit of the supply chain are obtained. Furthermore, the supply chain is coordinated by using revenue and expense sharing contract. Through the numerical example the impact of different remanufacturing cost saving on the optimal decision and the profits of the supply chain members, and the coordinating effect of the revenue and expense sharing contract are abtained. It can found that the manufacturer can influence the recycling price and recycling quantity of the used products recycled by the third re-manufacturer in the case of patent-protected remanufacturing, and then affect the revenue of manufacturer and the thirdre-manufacturer.