中文摘要：

本文首先以中共中央“八项规定”出台为天然的实验平台，研究了不同产权性质下寻租与企业绩效之间的因果关系。实证研究发现，针对民营企业，投资者对“八项规定”的出台做出了负面市场反应，而针对国有企业，投资者对“八项规定”的出台做出了正面市场反应，并且上述市场反应均在高寻租企业中更为明显。这说明，民营企业的寻租活动发挥了“润滑剂”功能，有助于企业绩效的提高，而国有企业的寻租行为则主要体现出“绊脚石”的逻辑，不利于企业绩效的提高。进一步，以政府补贴为切入点，对不同产权性质下寻租与企业绩效之间的作用机理进行了系统研究。本文的实证研究发现，无论是国有企业还是民营企业，寻租活动均有助于获得更多政府补贴。民营企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴对企业绩效具有一定的促进作用；而国有企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴不利于企业绩效的提高。这是因为民营企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴可以弥补资源的短缺，起到缓解融资约束的作用；而国有企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴将进一步造成资源冗余，引发过度投资。

英文摘要：

Taking the ＂eight regulations＂ as a natural experimental, the paper investigates the relationship between rent seeking and corporate performance under the different views of property rights. Empirical study finds that introduction of eight regulations makes negative market reaction for private enterprises and the opposite for state-owned enterprises, and the market reaction in high rent-seeking is more obvious. This shows that the rent-seeking activities of private enterprises play the lubricant role in improving their performance, and the rent-seeking behaviors in the state-owned enterprises mainly play the stumbling block role. Further, with the government subsidy as the breakthrough point, we further investigate the mechanism of the action of rent- seeking and corporate performance under different property rights. The empirical study finds that, whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, rent-seeking activities will help get more government subsidies. Through rent-seeking provate enterprise can obtain government subsidies to compensate for resource shortage, while the state-owned enterprise increase the source redundancy causing over-investment.