中文摘要：

从信息不对称的角度出发,考察了管理层预测消息的利好程度对权益资本成本的影响。研究发现,管理层预测消息的利好程度越高,越有利于权益资本成本的降低;相比于自愿性披露,强制性披露制度下管理层预测消息的利好程度越高,越能显著降低权益资本成本;随着股权集中度的提高,管理层预测消息的利好程度越高,越有利于权益资本成本的降低。

英文摘要：

This paper explores how a better message of management forecast effects the cost of equity capital in the view of the asymmetric information. We find that, better a message is, lower the cost of equity capital is. Compared with voluntary disclosure, man- agement forecast can be better in the compulsory exposure system, greatly decrease cost of equity capital accordingly. With the extent increasing of ownership concentration, a much more nicer forecast will help reduce the cost of equity capital.