中文摘要：

垄断的下游企业可与两个研发单位中的一个组成三种组织形式：相互独立、战略联盟和一体化.在研发竞赛中,相关研发单位与下游企业间的不同组织形式会影响另一研发单位的上游市场进入决策及投资决策.在相互独立和战略联盟两种组织形式下,研发单位都进入上游市场进而下游企业有着双重研发外包渠道.然而,战略联盟恒占优于相互独立.在战略联盟与一体化的比较中,尽管一体化可享有灵活性收益,但另一研发单位不进入上游市场进而下游企业的研发外包渠道被削减;而在战略联盟的组织形式下,下游企业虽不能享有灵活性收益,但能拥有多重研发外包渠道.其结果是,如果新产品市场规模的不确定性较大（小）,那么一体化将（被）占优于战略联盟.

英文摘要：

A monopolistic downstream firm can constitute three organizational forms with one of the two competing RD units： mutual stand-alone,strategic alliance and integration.In the RD race,the different organizational forms between the RD unit and downstream firms will affect the other RD unit＇s decisions on whether to enter upstream market and how much capital to invest.Under the two forms of stand-alone and strategic alliance,the RD units will both enter upstream market.Thus the downstream firm will face dual-channel RD outsourcing.However,the strategic alliance will always dominate the stand-alone.In the comparison between strategic alliance and integration,although integration has the flexibility benefits,the other RD unit will not enter upstream market while channels of RD outsourcing of downstream firms will then be reduced;under the form of strategic alliance,the firm cannot own the flexibility benefits,but it can own multi-channels of RD outsourcing.As a result,if the uncertainty of market size of the new product is higher（lower）,integration will dominate（be dominated by） the strategic alliance.