欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
民营企业“业绩变脸”是创业板健康良性发展的重要隐患。基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论，从战略决策的视角探讨创业板民营企业“业绩变脸”现象形成背后的战略决策机制。利用2009年至2013年中国创业板民营企业的相关数据，通过构建2SLS模型，分析民营企业引进风险资本实施IPO后，在由创始人家族主导的战略决策机制向专业化管理主导的战略决策机制转型过程中．创始人控股股东和风险资本股东如何构建战略决策机制，进而影响公司绩效。研究结果表明。民营企业IPO后风险资本并不能有效制衡创始人控股股东，战略决策机制依旧由创始人CEO主导，并且创始人CEO追逐战略决策权力的行为会损害公司绩效、排挤风险资本股东向董事会派出外部董事；代表风险资本股东利益的外部董事并没有促进民营企业形成专业的战略决策资源供给机制和监督机制，而是在股权退出收益的激励相容情境下不断强化创始人CEO权力的主导地位，共同操纵公司股价，损害公司绩效。
英文摘要：
The deterioration of private enterprises＇ performance is one of the important factors behind the healthy and benign de- velopment of GEM. Based on Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, we take the strategic decision-making view to in- vestigate the strategic decision-making mechanism underlying the phenomena of deterioration of private enterprises＇ performance. We employ data of GEM private enterprises from 2009 to 2013 to build 2SLS model and analyze the influence of strategic deci- sion-making mechanism constructed by founder CEO and outside directors from venture capital on corporate performance in the transition process of strategic decision-making mechanism originally dominated by founder family is gradually lead by specialized management after introducing venture capital and conducting IPO. The results show that venture capital cannot prevent founder from controlling shareholders and the strategic decision-making mechanism is still dominated by the founder CEO after IPO, while founder CEO, whose power brings about damages to corporate performance, also prevents venture capital from appointing outside directors to impair his power. Instead of introducing the professional strategic decision-making mechanism of resource supplying and monitoring to private enterprises, outside directors who represent venture capital shareholders focus on stock price profits will strengthen the manipulation of founders, collude with founder CEO, and harm corporate performance.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
位置：