中文摘要：

大股东对上市公司存在着明显的超控状态和天然的信息不对称优势，在公司的决策中很难遇到中小股东的阻力，因此，他们就具备利用中小股东的利益来为自己获得隐蔽的超额收益的机会。在此背景下，实证研究结果表明：（1）大股东利用非公开发行机会，虚增注入资产价值，侵害上市公司中小股东利益的现象普遍存在；（2）被控股股东“掏空”利益的上市公司无论是在非公开发行的“’窗口期”还是在随后的表现，累积超额收益率均低于未被控股股东掏空的上市公司；（3）非公开发行股票占原有上市公司股份的比例与非公开发行公司的市场表现有显著的正相关关系。

英文摘要：

There is a clear control of the ultra-right and natural advantages of information asymmetry of the major shareholders. It is difficult for company＇s small shareholders to face resistance, so major shareholders can have the interests of their over-income access to hidden opportunities. So the major shareholders have opportunities to ＂tunnel＂ the interest of companies. This article tests whether the major shareholders ＂tunnel＂ the offered companies and how is the performance of the listed companies by private securities offering.