作为一种中小投资者利益保护机制,现金选择权制度是我国证券市场独有的创新。本文对攀钢钢钒在两次重大资产重组中两次实施现金选择权的纵向单案例情境化研究采用三角测量、内容编码和数据分析方法,分析了攀钢钢钒两次实施现金选择权的方案设计、大股东重组动机、第三方行为、投机者套利交易和中小投资者利益保护,提炼发现了现金选择权的峡谷桥效应、增进重组效应、风险开放效应和债券化效应,构建了现金选择权制度作用机理理论和模型。
As a protection mechanism of medium and small investors' interests, cash option sys- tem is a unique innovation of China's stock market. Through a longitudinal and contextualized case study of Panzhihua New Steel & Vanadium, which implemented two cash options in two fundamental asset restructurings, this paper analyzes the company's design of two cash option plans, motivation of the major shareholders' restructurings, behavior of the third party, arbi-trage conducted by speculators and protection of medium and small investors' interests using the triangulation method, content coding and data analysis. It extracts and discovers the Gorge bridge effect, restructuring promoting effect, risk opening effect and bondilization effect of cash option, and builds an original theory and functioning mechanism model of cash option system.