中文摘要：

利用282家中国家族上市公司2007-2012年的平衡面板数据作为观测值,研究政治关联、制度环境与控股股东利益侵占之间的关系。研究发现,当家族上市公司存在直接政治关联时,控股股东利益侵占程度较大;政治关联强度越大,控股股东利益侵占程度越大;间接政治关联对控股股东利益侵占无显著性影响。当制度环境较差时,控股股东更有可能利用政治关联实施利益侵占,政治关联对控股股东利益侵占的影响更大。研究结论有助于我们更为全面地理解企业建立政治关联的利益动机。

英文摘要：

From the controlling shareholders＇ perspective,we use a panel data including 282 family-controlled listed firms from2007-2012 to study the relationship between the political connections,institutional environment and the occupation of the controlling shareholders. We find that,when the controlling family is in a direct political connection,the occupation of the controlling shareholders will be larger; when the firms have more executives in political connections,the benefit occupation will be more serious; but the indirect political connection has no significant effect on the controlling shareholders＇ occupation. When the institutional environment is poor,the controlling shareholders are more likely to use political connection to occupy the firms,the influence of political connection on the occupation of controlling shareholders is more serious. These conclusions can help us to understand the interest motivation of the political connection more comprehensively.