基于代理问题角度,利用我国2001—2005年上市公司面板数据,研究了我国上市公司股权结构与公司持有现金之间的相互关系。实证结果发现,两者之间的相互关系符合代理问题存在的基本表征,即代理问题较为严重的上市公司拥有更高的现金持有水平。控股股东尤其是国有股东,并没有随着持股比例增加产生通常意义上的地下利益攫取行为,而是更多地支持了控股股东提升公司绩效的假说。
Based on agency problems analysis, this paper studies the relationship between corporate cash holdings and ownership structure. The results suggest the relation is consistent with the base character of agency theory. That is to say, the firms of poor corporate governance have higher level of cash holdings. Controlling shareholders, especially state - owned shareholders, have more supervising effects not tuaneling effects with the proportion of shares increasing.