构建由国有企业组成的双寡头垄断竞争模型,分析产能过剩与国有股比例及沉淀成本之间的关系。结论表明,国有股最优比例是一个动态变量,受国有与非国有资本效率的影响;沉淀成本与产能过剩程度之间呈负相关关系,但有损于社会福利,降低甚至是完全消除产能过剩未必有助于提升社会福利;产能过剩与国有股比例之间的关系受国有及非国有资本效率的影响,国有产权与产能过剩之间没有必然联系。
This paper constructs the double oligarchies competition model which is composed of two state-owned enterprises,and analyzes the relationship between the excess capacity and suck cost,the proportion of state-owned shares. Results show that,the optimal proportion of state-owned shares is a dynamic variable,which is influenced by the efficiencies of the stateowned and non-state-owned capital; there exists negative correlation between the suck cost that is negative to the social welfare and excess capacity; the relationship between the proportion of state-owned shares and the excess capacity is affected by the efficiencies of the state-owned and non-state-owned capital,and there is no necessary connection between the state-owned property rights and excess capacity.